Bangui M'Poko International Airport BGF / FEFF

CORRECTIONS FROM DRAFT — (1) Coordinates tightened to 4.3985N/18.5188E: two independent sources (Wikipedia DMS 04°23'54.51"N 018°31'07.63"E, and OurAirports 4.398480/18.518801) converge here; the draft's 4.3978/18.5197 was off by roughly 100 meters. (2) Elevation ft corrected 1207 -> 1208 (368m confirmed everywhere; 1208ft is the consistent independent rounding across three sources). (3) REMOVED the draft's second runway (grass, 2000m, also mislabeled 16/34 — duplicating the first runway's designation, which is itself impossible at a single airport without an L/R suffix). No source checked (Wikipedia, OurAirports, flight-planning nav data) shows more than one runway at BGF; every one explicitly describes a SINGLE runway. Treat the grass-strip entry as erroneous/fabricated unless a primary source turns up. (4) Runway designation is genuinely disputed between sources: OurAirports and the Wikipedia infobox list 16/34, while Wikipedia's prose text AND flight-planning nav data (ILS localizer front course approximately 345 degrees magnetic, which is consistent with a '35' designator under standard rounding) both point to 17/35 — matching what was flagged for verification going in. This record adopts 17/35 as the more likely current value, but the conflict is NOT fully resolved; confirm against the live ASECNA eAIP/NOTAM before operational use, since a runway renumbering from magnetic-variation drift cannot be ruled out at this near-equatorial site. (5) Softened the draft's confident 'ILS CAT II' claim: nav data confirms a working localizer/glideslope/DME, but nothing found confirms CAT II approach category specifically, which is an unusually high standard for an airport at this traffic level — flag as unverified pending primary AIP confirmation. (6) 'SODIAC' as infrastructure-development operator could not be corroborated in any source checked (general web search, Wikipedia, aviation press) — flagged as unverified in the operator field above rather than silently kept or silently dropped. (7) Pax figure (~150,000, 2024) remains an estimate from secondary sources — no ASECNA/ANAC-RCA passenger bulletin was locatable. For context, Wikipedia's historical series (unverified against a primary source but internally consistent with CAR's conflict timeline) shows: 2003 approx 12,700; 2004 approx 53,900; 2007 approx 97,600; 2008 approx 107,100; 2012 approx 120,000; 2014 approx 11,600 (a collapse consistent with the 2013-2014 Seleka coup / civil-war crisis). The rebound implied by 150,000 in 2024 is plausible given the post-conflict recovery narrative but is unconfirmed; treat strictly as indicative. (8) MINUSCA/humanitarian hub role retained from the draft — this remains consistent with available reporting and CAR's known security context, and was not contradicted by anything found. The single runway serves as the country's sole scheduled-jet gateway and doubles as a base for MINUSCA (UN peacekeeping) and other humanitarian/NGO air operations, competing with civil traffic for apron and handling capacity. (9) Scheduled carriers as of 2024-2025 per the draft: ASKY (Lome/Douala), Ethiopian Airlines (reported resumption of Addis Ababa service Nov 2023, reported 3x weekly), Royal Air Maroc (Casablanca), RwandAir (Kigali), and Afrijet — none of these specific resumption dates/frequencies were. Wikipedia additionally lists Air Cote d'Ivoire as a BGF operator, which the draft omitted. Frequencies are thin and change often given the security and financing environment — verify against carrier sites before ticketing.